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Abstract
The transformation of U.S. utilities from purely domestic to multinational enterprises commenced in
1992 with the passage of The Energy Policy Act (EPAct). In response to the liberalized regulatory climate,
29 U.S. utilities have diversified their holdings through the acquisition of foreign utilities, many of which
are located in emerging market countries. This study analyzes the impact of international diversification
on the profitability and valuation of U.S.-based multinational utilities during the years 1996–2000.
In order to control for the effects of aggregate economic and regulatory changes, purely domestic
utilities are also included in the sample. The empirical tests are conducted utilizing an earnings-and-book
value model. Compared to purely domestic utilities, multinational utilities report lower absolute and
relative rates of profitability, exhibit higher levels of systematic risk and trade at higher market-to-book
ratios. Taken together, these results suggest investors may be systematically overpricing the equities of
U.S.-based multinational utilities. A further finding of this paper is that accounting information explains
a lower percentage of the variation in equity prices for multinational utilities relative to their domestic
counterparts.
© 2003 Elsevier Science Inc. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Equity valuation; International accounting; Utility deregulation; Foreign direct; Investment

1. Introduction
The international diversification of U.S. electrical utility companies has been a relatively
recent occurrence. The transformation of U.S. utilities from purely domestic to multinational
enterprises commenced in 1992 with the passage of The Energy Policy Act (EPAct). Concurrent
with the passage of this legislation in the United States, many countries throughout the world
∗
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enacted legislation that fundamentally altered the structure of the energy markets in their
respective domestic markets. In most countries, the changes in the regulatory environment
included a liberalization of the markets and the allowance for the participation by foreign
investors in what had been heretofore closed domestic markets.
Kilgore (1997) points out that U.S. electrical utilities were faced with limited growth opportunities at home: in the relatively mature domestic market, growth rates were projected to
average 2% per annum over the foreseeable future. At the same time, electricity demand in
many areas of world, in particular “emerging market countries,” was estimated to increase at
rates of over 7% per year. Coupled with this increase, many countries simply lacked the power
generation resources necessary to accommodate this growing demand. In nearly every emerging
market country,1 the utility sector was completely owned, controlled and operated by the State.
The resource scarcity facing these State enterprises was exacerbated in the face of the lingering
effects created by the debt crisis of the 1980’s and the breakup of the former Soviet Union.
In response to this situation, many countries began deregulating and denationalizing their
utility markets.2 The deregulation allowed for private participation in the generation and distribution of electric energy. The denationalization paved the way for foreign participation in what
had been in most cases zealously protected domestic markets. This fundamental change in policy was motivated by two primary factors: the need to supply energy to rapidly growing domestic
markets and the need to raise cash, preferably in dollars, to service external debts. Although
multinational firms from several countries, including Spain, France, and Italy, have invested in
Latin American and other emerging market utilities over the past decade, U.S. utilities are the
dominant players in these rapidly changing and growing markets. To date, over two dozen U.S.
utility firms have acquired the assets of denationalized energy concerns throughout the world.
The global expansion of U.S.-based utilities presents a rich setting for examining the valuation relevance of accounting information for several reasons. Firstly, according to Lev a
paradox exists given that financial information retains the qualities of relevance and reliability
in mostly stable sectors of the economy while investors’ demand for information peaks when
the environment is highly unpredictable.3 Secondly, in most cases the control and ownership
of the acquired firms shifted along two dimensions: from domestic to foreign and from public
to private. Finally, by expanding across borders, U.S. utilities are increasing their firms’ overall
riskiness.4
Kilgore (1997) documents that the equities of U.S. utility firms with foreign exposure trade
at higher multiples, defined as the market-to-book ratio, relative to purely domestic utilities.
At the same time, he points out that there exists no discernable differences in profitability,
measured as the rate-of-return on equity, between purely domestic and multinational utilities.
From these two facts taken together, Kilgore asserts that investors are paying higher prices for
the perceived higher future profitability of multinational utilities.
The research question this paper seeks to answer is: are investors systematically overpricing the equities of U.S. multinational utilities? Specifically, are investors focusing solely on
growth opportunities while ignoring significant political and exchange rate risks, which may
significantly impact or even eliminate future profits? Additionally, are investors focusing on
accounting information5 when valuing the equities of multinational utilities?
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the changing regulatory environment as it pertains to foreign direct investment. Section 3 surveys the academic
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literature in the area. Section 4 discusses some theoretical issues and develops a model for
empirical testing. Section 5 delineates the statistical results. The final section concludes with
a discussion and avenues for future research.

2. Response of U.S. firms to liberalized investment climate
As previously discussed, two simultaneous sets of events were responsible for the recent
wave of U.S. foreign direct investment in foreign utility companies, especially those in Latin
America. Firstly, sweeping economic reforms6 were enacted in many countries that paved the
way for foreign participation in the energy sector. Secondly, the regulatory climate in the U.S.
also experienced a radical shift beginning in 1992 following the passage of the Energy Policy
Act. The 1992 law overturned major provisions of the Public Utility Holding Company Act
of 1935, a cornerstone of New Deal legislation. For over 50 years, U.S. utility companies
were governed by what Geisst (2000, p. 9) refers to as the “death sentence provision: a utility
could not own more than one operating system.” In order to prevent market concentration, this
provision restricted public utilities from expanding both within and outside the United States.
In the wake of the newly deregulated climate, over two dozen U.S. firms seized upon the
opportunity to invest in Latin American and other foreign markets in which the regulatory
framework was rapidly changing. In the early 1990’s, many U.S. firms, including American Electric Power Company, PacifiCorp and Dominion Resources, invested in utility companies in the industrialized countries of the United Kingdom and Australia. However, by
the middle of the decade Latin America increasingly became the destination for new utility
foreign direct investment. A list of entrants into various Latin countries includes some of
the largest U.S. utility concerns: Duke Power, AES, Enron, Southern Company, and GPU.
Moreover, some smaller entities, such as Teco Energy, also count Latin holdings among their
investments.
Even within a much more liberalized climate, the Public Utility Holding Company Act
effectively limits the combined total amount of foreign direct investment and investment in
exempt wholesale generators to 50% of the parent company’s consolidated retained earnings
(Alliant Energy, 2000, Form 10-K).7 Notwithstanding this restriction, many U.S. firms report
that foreign operations account for a significant portion of their consolidated assets, revenues
and operating income.
Duke Energy reports that in 1999 foreign operations accounted for 10% of overall corporate
revenues and 15% of consolidated long-lived assets (Duke Energy, 2000, Form 10-K). Public
Service Electric and Gas (PSEG) indicates that 14% of total corporate assets are located
overseas. Interestingly, PSEG also reports that only 3% of consolidated revenues are derived
from foreign sources (PSEG, 2000, Form 10-K). Finally, the corporation with the highest
percentage of foreign exposure appears to be the AES Company of Arlington, Virginia. AES
discloses that in 2000 fully 55% of its total revenues came from foreign sources; Central and
South American operations alone contributed 30% towards the total.
Many of the corporations under investigation indicate that the underlying rationale for
investing in foreign operations is to increase aggregate corporate earnings.8 The link between
international diversification and increased profitability is explored below.
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3. Review of the academic literature
Continuing with the theme that U.S. utilities venture overseas in search of profit-making
opportunities, this section surveys some of the academic literature that should provide some
insights about the outcome of this prediction. This section also examines some of the issues surrounding the measurement of profitability in the context of foreign direct investments including
the impact of currency movements.
3.1. The impact of foreign acquisitions
Several theories offer explanations regarding the underlying rationale for initiating foreign direct investments. Among these are the rate-of-return theory (Blais, 1975), which states
that foreign direct investments flow from low rate-of-return countries to high rate-of-return
countries. Other theories include the product cycle theory (Vernon, 1974) where foreign direct
investment (FDI) is undertaken to extend the life of goods and portfolio theory (Rugman, 1979)
where FDI is used as a vehicle to reduce total firm risk.9 Given that U.S.-based multinationals
are shifting resources from low- to high-growth countries, the rate-of-return theory provides a
useful framework for understanding the strategy of these firms.
Nearly three decades ago, Leftwich (1974) documented a positive relationship between
multinationality and an increased level of profitability. Errunza and Senbert (1981) posit that
multinational firms are capable of earning monopoly rents vis-à-vis uninationals due to international imperfections in product, factor and capital markets. Hines (1996) shows that U.S.-based
multinationals pay dividends from foreign profits at three times the rate of domestic profits; he
conjectures firms may do so in order to signal the permanent nature of foreign earning streams.
Markides and Ittner (1994) demonstrate that foreign acquisitions are value increasing when
the bidder has existing foreign operations and when the acquisition takes place in a related
industry. Doukas and Travlos (1988) find that shareholders experience significant wealth gains
when multinational corporations announce acquisitions in less-developed countries. Doukas
and Travlos explain that the relatively low degree of integration between developed and developing country economies increases the benefits of multinational expansion for U.S.-based
parent firms.
In continuation, Weston, Chung and Siu (1998, p. 351) state:
A profitable firm in a slow-growing economy may be throwing off cash flow beyond its
internal investment needs. It makes sense, all else being equal, to invest this surplus cash in a
faster-growing economy than in the slow-growth domestic economy.

In the late 1990’s, the demand for energy in emerging market countries was growing at
3.5 times the rate in the United States. However, it is unclear if acquisition-based growth
strategies will translate into increased profits for U.S.-based multinational utilities. Existing
theory and evidence (e.g., see Doukas and Travlos, 1988; Harris and Ravenscraft, 1991; Morck
and Yeung, 1991) have focused on cross-border acquisitions in the context of publicly traded
bidder and target firms. Furthermore, the extant literature contains contradictory statements
on the profit-generating ability of former state enterprises. For example, Sader (1995, p. 13)
asserts, “A major reason for privatizing an SOE (state-owned enterprise) is that the enterprise

J.A.M. Pinto / Journal of International Accounting, Auditing & Taxation 12 (2003) 23–43

27

is uncompetitive.” Conversely, Nazmi (1998, p. 483) contends, “The downsizing of the public
sector and the corresponding privatization of state enterprises have offered foreign capital fresh
and potentially highly profitable investment venues.”
Due to the fact that large-scale privatizations of former state enterprises commenced in the
late 1980’s, Dewatripont and Roland (1995) explain that a rigorous theory of transition has
yet to be fully developed. Such a theory would aid researchers in establishing the linkages
between privatizations, foreign direct investment and rates of return in a changing institutional
context. However, the absence of a well-developed theoretical framework has not prevented
researchers from conducting empirical investigations into post-privatization profitability; these
are discussed in the section that follows.
3.2. Post-privatization profitability
Several recent empirical investigations have examined the post-privatization performance
of former State enterprises. Given that U.S. utilities are not only investing overseas but are
also acquiring entities through the privatization process, this literature is relevant to the current
discussion.
One of the first such studies, Megginson, Nash and Randenborgh (1994) is a cross-sectional
times series study of the effects of privatization in 32 countries across 18 industries during the
time period 1961–1990. Megginson et al. arrive at the conclusion that privatization produces
the following benefits: (1) an increase in real sales; (2) an increase in profitability; (3) an
increase in capital spending; (4) an increase in operating efficiency, and (5) higher levels of
employment. However, the results of their study are subject to the following caveats. Firstly,
the majority of their sample firms came from industrialized countries; i.e., the results may not
be generalizable to developing countries. Secondly, in many cases government ownership of
firms was simply reduced, not entirely eliminated. Finally, many of the firms in their sample
were domiciled in countries such as Germany, France, Japan and the United Kingdom which
have well developed capital markets that supplied much of the financing necessary to complete
the privatization.
A subsequent investigation, published by Boubakri and Cosset (1998), examines the performance of privatized firms located solely in the developing world. Similar to Megginson et al.,
they conclude that privatization increases efficiency, output, employment, capital spending
and dividend payouts. They also document a decrease in leverage following the privatization
process. Boubakri and Cosset arrive at their conclusions by comparing accounting-based performance measures, such as return on sales, dividends to sales, and total debt to total assets,
from the pre- and post-privatization periods.
Once again, several methodological issues raise questions surrounding the veracity of their
results. Firstly, they were able to solicit data for only 79 of the 203 companies in their original
sample, indicating a potential response bias. Secondly, the accounting data they obtained came
from the companies themselves or from local regulatory boards; there is no indication that
this data has been obtained from audited financial statements. Thirdly, they mix data that
has been prepared under accounting conventions from 21 different developing countries. A
significant number of their sample firms come from countries such as Malaysia, Nigeria,
Pakistan and Turkey, locales which traditionally have not been associated with high-quality
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financial reporting (Saudagaran and Diga, 1997). Finally, as they readily acknowledge, many
developing country governments assumed the debt service of state enterprises prior to their
sale in order to increase their attractiveness to outside investors.
D’Souza and Megginson (1999) overcome some of these difficulties when they analyze
the financial and operating performance of 85 firms that were privatized during the 1990’s.
Their sample includes companies from both developed and developing countries and from 21
industries. Given that many recent privatizations involved regulated industries, nearly 25% of
their sample firms, 20, are electric utilities. In line with the two studies referenced above, they
also document increases in accounting-based metrics in the post-privatization period.
D’Souza and Megginson point out that they employ local currency-based accounting data;
hence their study does not take into consideration how exchange rate fluctuations vis-à-vis the
U.S. dollar would impact these ratios. For the purposes of the current study this is not a trivial
point—U.S. investors, who provided much of the financing which made the privatization of
foreign utilities possible, are interested in dollar-denominated profitability metrics. In fact, the
pressure to produce dollar denominated profits is so strong that several multinational utilities,
including AES Corporation and Teco Energy Inc.,10 have pegged their rate structures in some
foreign markets to the dollar in order to insulate their earnings stream from exchange rate
shocks.
Following deregulation, the performance of U.S. utilities is increasingly judged by how well
they meet quarterly profit expectations. The next section discusses the linkage between utility
firm profitability and valuation in a deregulated environment.
3.3. Profitability and utility firm valuation
In the aftermath of deregulation in the United States, the relative impact of earnings on utility
firm valuation has shifted. In a regulated environment, Teets (1992) finds that the earnings
response coefficients (ERCs) are smaller for utilities relative to other types of firms. The
rationale for his finding is as follows. In a regulated environment, utility rates were set to cover
both operating and capital costs. It therefore follows that utilities’ profitability was largely
a function of its invested capital. Hence, utilities’ earnings releases did not convey much
incremental information to market participants.
Nwaeze (1998, p. 551) extends the analysis presented in Teets. Specifically, Nwaeze demonstrates that “Over time, the difference between the market and book values for utilities is not
statistically significant, suggesting that the cost-plus pricing is reasonably effective in aligning
market with book value.” Nwaeze also finds that book values play a larger role in valuation for
utilities relative to a control sample of capital intensive manufacturing firms. Hence, during
the time period of this study, 1970–1990, earnings were not a primary determinant of value for
publicly traded utilities.
Blacconiere, Johnson and Johnson (2000) investigate whether earnings become more informative following deregulation. Employing an earnings-and-book value model they conclude
that book value plays a more important role relative to earnings prior to deregulation; this
ordering shifts in the aftermath of deregulation. However, the mean parameter estimate on
earnings for utility firms, 2.935, is significantly lower than for nonutilities, 7.900 during the
same time period.11
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As utility firms expand overseas, it is unclear whether earnings will continue to play a similar
role in overall firm valuation. Several reasons account for this. Firstly, Bodnar and Weintrop
(1997) find that the foreign earnings of U.S. multinational firms are capitalized by the market
at higher rates relative to domestic earnings. Bodnar and Weintrop attribute this result to the
fact that market participants perceive that foreign earnings are growing at faster rates relative
to domestic earnings. However, an uncertain regulatory climate coupled with exchange rate
instability may work against applying Bodnar and Weintrop’s results to the utility industry.
Furthermore, as a result of current accounting conventions, investors may not receive a true
picture of the firms’ exchange rate exposure. Under SFAS No. 52, Foreign Currency Translation, foreign currency translation gains (losses) do not flow through net income but are instead
reported directly as an addition to (subtraction from) stockholders’ equity. More recently, under
SFAS No. 130, Reporting Comprehensive Income, foreign currency translation adjustments
are recognized in comprehensive income although they are still omitted as an element of net
income. In contrast to what the efficient market hypothesis would predict, Hirst and Hopkins
(1998) find that the judgements of sophisticated financial statement users, i.e., financial analysts, are influenced by the way in which the elements of comprehensive income are reported.
In a deregulated, global, and dynamic institutional environment, it is likely that net income,
and to a lesser extent comprehensive income, plays an important function in the valuation of
multinational utilities. The next section draws upon the extant literature to create a model with
which to test the aforementioned hypotheses.
4. Testable hypothesis and model development
The following section builds upon the work of Blacconiere et al. (2000). They contend utility
equity values can be constructed as a function of book value and earnings. They also conclude
that earnings play a more important role in valuation following deregulation. However, the
results of Blacconiere et al. may not be generalizable to an international setting.
Specifically, the contention of the current paper is that, ceteris paribus, both book values and
earnings should be less value relevant for multinational utilities relative to purely domestic concerns. The impact of global expansion is predicted to impact book value and earnings as follows.
4.1. Book values
It will be recalled that Kilgore (1997) documents that the equities of U.S. utility firms with
foreign exposure trade at higher multiples, defined as the market-to-book ratio, relative to
purely domestic utilities. Theoretically, the market-to-book value ratio should be equal to one
if accounting and market value measures of firm value are symmetric; deviations from unity are
an indication that accounting information omits fundamental determinants of value. Kilgore’s
results suggest that this deviation is larger for multinational utilities.
4.2. Earnings
Bernstein (1993, p. 745) explains that firms with foreign subsidiaries will have increased
volatility in their earnings series due to the following factors:
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The quality of foreign earnings is affected by factors such as difficulties and uncertainties
regarding the repatriation of funds, currency fluctuations, the political and social climate as
well as local customs and regulation. With regard to the latter, the inability to dismiss personnel
in some countries in effect converts labor costs into fixed costs.

In accordance with Bernstein’s assertions, U.S.-based multinational utilities operate in an
highly unpredictable environment. As a result, foreign generated earnings are subject to both
regulatory and exchange rate risk. These negative risk factors temper the benefits derived from
operating in markets in which the demand for energy is growing at three times or more the
domestic rate.
The regulatory environment is rapidly changing in many developing country markets. Recent
developments point to the fact that this rapid change is accompanied by much instability. Hence,
utility rate structures are likely to be less predictable. Even though energy markets have been
substantially liberalized in many countries, U.S. firms must still adhere to rates established
by various governmental agencies. In Argentina, the oversight of the utility industry rests
with Enre, a federal agency. The Brazilian regulatory agency, Agencia Nacional de Energia
Electrica (ANEEL) was established just a short time ago: December 1997.
The brief tenure of these and similar regulatory agencies worldwide has been put to the test
several times as disputes arise between foreign investors and domestic stakeholders. In Brazil,
ANEEL has had to mediate differences between the government of Minas Gerais state and AES
over issues involving the privatized utility, Cemig. In India, a much-publicized disagreement
has developed between Enron and the Maharashtra State Electricity Board over electricity
tariffs and related payments in arrears.12
Foreign generated earnings are also subject to greater variation due to exchange rate risk.
This risk is explicitly stated in the SEC filings of the following two firms:
Investing in foreign countries involves certain additional risks. Economic conditions that result
in higher comparative rates of inflation in foreign countries are likely to result in declining
values in such countries’ currencies. (PSEG, 2000 Form 10-K)
Although management currently believes that the currency exchange rate fluctuations over the
long term will not have a material adverse effect on CMS Energy’s financial position, liquidity
or results of operations, CMS Energy has hedged its exposure to the Australian dollar, the
Brazilian real and the Argentine peso. (CMS Energy Corp., 1999 Form 10-K)

In spite of the availability of mechanisms to hedge foreign exchange rate risk, the impact of
declining currency values is reflected on the financial statements of U.S.-based multinational
utilities. Specifically, these amounts are reported in the cumulative translation adjustment
account, an adjustment to stockholders’ equity. Many of the firms in this study report a large
and growing debit balance in this account.
Hence, as the factors above illustrate foreign derived earnings would be expected to be less
predictable relative to domestic earnings. Their lower predictive power would thus make them
less value-relevant to market participants.
The above-mentioned assertions can be formally stated in the following hypotheses:
H1. There are no differences in unexplained influences on valuation between multinational
and domestic utilities.
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H2. There are no differences in the value relevance of book values between multinational and
domestic utilities.
H3. There are no differences in the value relevance of earnings between multinational and
domestic utilities.
H4. Foreign currency translation adjustments are not relevant in the valuation of multinational
utilities.
4.3. Empirical model
An earnings-and-book value model:
MVE = BVE + (1/r)NI

(1)

where MVE is the market value of equity; BVE, book value of equity; NI, net income of the
firm; r, firm’s cost of capital will be expanded and stated in its empirical form to test the above
assertions.
Pt+1 = β0 + β1 × MULTI + β2 × BVEt + β3 × MULTI × BVEt + β4 × EPSt + β5
×MULTI × EPSt + β6 × FCTA + ε
(2)
where, Pt +1 is the per share market value of equity 30 days after quarterly close; MULTI,
dummy variable coded 1 for multinational, 0 for domestic utilities; BVEt , book value of equity
per share at quarterly close; EPSt , quarterly earnings per share; FCTA, quarterly per share
change in the value of the cumulative translation adjustment account; ε and an error term
assumed independent and identically distributed.

5. Empirical results
5.1. Sample and data
Sample firms were categorized as multinational utilities if they have foreign direct investment
in at least one country outside of the United States. Candidate firms were identified from a
variety of sources: corporate annual reports, 10-K filings, press releases, U.S. government
reports, and articles from the financial press. Table 1 lists the 29 firms, along with their foreign
holdings, which are considered to be multinational utilities.
In addition to the requirement that firms have at least one foreign affiliate, sample firms came
one of the following three standard industrial classification (SIC) groups: 4911, electric services; 4923, natural gas transmission and distribution; and 4931, electricity and other services
combined. This study is primarily concerned with enterprises which generate, transmit, and
distribute electrical energy and natural gas; therefore, water, sanitation and telecommunications
companies were excluded from the sample.
In order to control for the effects of aggregate economic and regulatory changes, purely
domestic utilities are also included in the sample. Fifty-three domestic utilities, from the same
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Table 1
U.S. multinational utilities and location of foreign holdings
Company name
AES CORP

a

ALLIANT CORP
AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWERa
CALPINE CORP
CENTRAL & SOUTH WEST CORP
CINERGY CORP
CMS ENERGY CORP
COGENERATION CORP OF AMERICA
DOMINION RESOURCES INCa
DUKE ENERGY CORPa
EDISON INTERNATIONALa
ENRON CORPa
ENTERGY CORP
GPU INC
NEW CENTURY ENERGIES INC
NIAGARA MOHAWK HOLDINGS INC
NORTHEAST UTILITIES
OGDEN CORP
PACIFICORP
PUBLIC SERVICE ENTERPRISESa
QUESTAR CORP
RELIANT ENERGY INCa
SOUTHERN Coa
TECO ENERGY INC
TXU CORPa
WESTERN GAS RESOURCES INC
WESTERN RESOURCES INC
WILLIAMS COS INCa
XCEL ENERGY INC

Country/region of foreign investments
Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China,
Columbia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Georgia,
Hungary, India, Italy, Kazakhstan, The Netherlands, Nigeria,
Mexico, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Sri Lanka, the Ukraine, the
United Kingdom, Venezuela
Australia, Brazil, China, Mexico, New Zealand
Australia, China, the United Kingdom
Canada, the United Kingdom
Brazil, Chile, Mexico, the United Kingdom
Czech Republic, Estonia, Spain, the United Kingdom, Zambia
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Venezuela
The United Kingdom
Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Canada, Peru, the United Kingdom
Australia, Brazil, Canada
New Zealand, the United Kingdom
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, India,
Jamaica, Korea, Nicaragua, the Philippines, Venezuela
Argentina, Chile, Pakistan, Peru
Argentina, Australia, the United Kingdom
The United Kingdom, Other (?)
Canada
Argentina, the United Kingdom
North America, Asia, Central and South America, Europe
Australia
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru
Canada
Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador, Others (?)
Australia, Brazil, Canada, the Caribbean, Chile, China, Germany,
Italy, The Netherlands, the Philippines, Switzerland, the United
Kingdom
Guatemala, Costa Rica, the Czech Republic
Australia, Mexico, the United Kingdom
Canada
Colombia, the People’s Republic of China, Turkey
Australia, Brazil, Canada, Lithuania, Venezuela
Czech Republic, the United Kingdom

Latin American holdings are indicated in bold. (?) Indicates firms have other, unspecified, foreign investments.
a
Indicates firm is 1 of the 15 firms used to calculate the Dow Jones Utility Average.

SIC groups, were identified. The final sample contains 1147 quarterly observations comprised
of 44% multinational and 56% domestic utilities.13
The time frame for the study runs from the first quarter of 1996 through the third quarter of
2000. In contrast to much of the extant literature, this study uses quarterly rather than annual
data. Several factors account for this. Firstly, events are rapidly unfolding in the arena of utility
deregulation. For example, California began experiencing an “energy crisis” during the latter
half of 2000. In addition, Brazil is confronting an energy crisis of its own. Hence, the intent of
this study is to establish a “cut off” point of September 30, 2000 which would not include the
impact of these recent events. Secondly, prior to 1996, the number of U.S. utilities with foreign
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Table 2
Descriptive statistics
Variable
Market value of equity
Earnings per share
Book value per share
Foreign currency translation
adjustment-per share
Total assets
Liquidity
Capital intensity
Return on equity (annualized)

Quarterly
observations
1147
1147
1147
1147

Minimum

1147
1147
1147
1147

$319 million
1%
16%
−93%

1.97
−1.79
0.32
−0.80

Maximum
82.06
1.78
33.01
0.38
$52,996 million
27%
95%
63%

Mean
27.81
0.43
16.71
−0.01
$10,358 million
2%
65%
10%

Standard
deviation
10.12
0.44
6.41
0.0017
$260 million
0.0007
0.004
11.83

(1) Where: market value of equity = common share price 30 days after the quarterly close; earnings per
share = quarterly basic earnings per share; liquidity = cash and cash equivalents divided by total assets; and capital
intensity = net property, plant and equipment divided by total assets.
(2) Pearson’s index of skewness fell between +1 and −1 for the following variables: market value of equity,
earnings per share, book value per share and capital intensity. For the remaining variables, some degree of skewness
was detected. However, these variables were not included in the regressions as either dependent or independent
variables.

operations would not have been large enough to permit an empirical analysis.14 Finally, due to
the relatively small number of sample firms, quarterly observations increased the sample size
four-fold which greatly increases the power of the statistical tests.
The data used in the empirical testing, with one exception, was downloaded from Standard
and Poor’s COMPUSTAT database. The sole data item not available through the COMPUSTAT
database was the value of the foreign currency translation adjustment account. This data had to
be hand-collected from each firms’ quarterly 10-Q filing. The EDGAR database was employed
for this purpose.
The market value of equity was measured 30 days after the close of the fiscal quarter; e.g.,
April 30 corresponding to the first quarter observation. Earnings are defined to be basic earnings
per share; basic earnings per share are highly correlated with fully diluted earnings per share.
Descriptive statistics for the overall sample are presented in Table 2.
5.2. Firm characteristics: multinational versus domestic utilities
Table 3 reports univariate tests of key variables partitioned by type: multinational and
domestic.15 The mean value for both the market value of equity and book value per share are
not significantly different from one another (t = 1.772, p < 0.082 and t = 0.745, p < 0.474).
However, the average market-to-book value is significantly higher (t = −3.181, p < 0.002)
for multinational versus purely domestic utilities.
For other firm characteristics discernable differences exist between purely domestic and
multinational utilities. Domestic utilities are more profitable (t = 3.088, p < 0.002), reporting
mean quarterly earnings per share of $0.46 versus $0.38 for multinational entities.16 The
difference is even more pronounced (t = 3.870, p = 0.000) when foreign currency translation
adjustments are included to arrive at a measure of comprehensive income. Scaling earnings
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Table 3
t-tests for equality of means
Variable

Group

Group mean

Market value of equity

Domestic firms
Multinational firms

28.26
27.21

Quarterly earnings per share

Domestic firms
Multinational firms

0.46
0.38

t = 3.088∗
p < 0.002

Quarterly earnings per
share-scaled by market

Domestic firms

0.016

t = 2.158∗

Multinational firms

0.013

p < 0.031

Value of equity

Domestic firms
Multinational firms

0.46
0.36

t = 3.870∗
p < 0.000

Quarterly comprehensive
earnings per share

Domestic firms

16.83

t = 0.745

Multinational firms

16.55

p < 0.474

Book value per share

Domestic firms
Multinational firms

1.77
2.04

Market-to-book value

Domestic firms
Multinational firms

10.74%
9.20%

Annualized return on equity

Domestic firms
Multinational firms

1.78%
2.31%

Liquidity

Domestic firms
Multinational firms

66.56%
62.72%

t = 4.771∗
p = 0.000

Capital intensity

Domestic firms
Multinational firms

$7,155 million
$14,892 million

t = −16.159∗
p = 0.000

Total assets

Domestic firms
Multinational firms

3.03%
2.49%

t = 2.815∗
p = 0.005

Beta

Domestic firms
Multinational firms

0.43
0.47

t = −4.537∗
p = 0.000

∗

t-test for equality
of means
t = 1.772
p < 0.082

t = −3.181∗
p < 0.002
t = 2.200∗
p < 0.026
t = −3.313∗
p < 0.001

Statistically significant.

per share by market value of equity yields a similar (t = 2.158, p < 0.031) differential.
Additionally, multinational firms produced a lower annualized return on equity, 9.20% versus
10.74% for purely domestic firms. It will be recalled that Kilgore’s (1997) study found no
difference in return on equity between the two classes of utilities.
The lower absolute and relative levels of profitability for multinational utilities may be
explained in part by two factors. Firstly, as the data in Table 1 illustrate, many of these firms
have operations in emerging market countries. In several regions, financial and exchange rate
shocks in the late 1990’s17 undoubtedly negatively impacted overall corporate profitability.
Secondly, in many developing countries, U.S. utilities are confronting an unclear regulatory
framework which has produced some unforeseen problems regarding rate setting.18 Finally, it
may also be argued that nascent multinational firms face a “learning curve” regarding foreign
operations which may reduce the profitability of overseas projects in their early years.

J.A.M. Pinto / Journal of International Accounting, Auditing & Taxation 12 (2003) 23–43

35

Table 4
Estimation of interactive effects model
Model: Pt +1 = β0 + β1 × MULTI + β2 × BVEt + β3 × MULTI × BVEt + β4
× EPSt + β5 × MULTI × EPSt + ε
Variable
Coefficient
Standard error
t-statistic

Significance

Constant
MULTI
BVE
BVE × MULTI
EPS
EPS × MULTI

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.045

10.365
5.038
0.996
−0.395
3.753
2.524
Adjusted R2 = 0.334

1.032
1.421
0.064
0.085
0.791
1.258

10.042
3.545
15.109
−4.674
4.745
2.007
F = 115.981

Interestingly, multinational utilities, on average, are much larger relative to purely domestic
utilities (t = −16.159, p = 0.000). The size advantage of multinational firms does not appear
to translate into economic returns to scale: the return on assets is lower for this group of firms
(t = 2.815, p < 0.005) relative to domestic utilities.
While both multinational and domestic utilities report fairly low betas,19 the difference is
statistically significant (t = −4.537, p = 0.000). Hence, multinational utilities have a higher
level of systematic risk relative to purely domestic concerns. These results corroborate evidence
presented in Siegel, Theerathorn and Alcerrcea-Joaquim (1992) which suggests that the firm’s
level of risk initially increases and then decreases with the level of foreign activity.
Finally, as a percentage of total assets, multinational utilities have a significantly (t =
−3.313, p < 0.001) higher proportion of cash on their balance sheets. Given their larger
average size, they also have on average 2.7 times as much cash in absolute terms. The relevance of this factor for the current study can be explained by evidence reported by Harford
(1999). His study indicates that cash-rich firms tend to make poorer investment decisions
given that they have fewer agency constraints imposed on their actions by the capital
market.
5.3. OLS estimation results
Tables 4 and 5 contain the results of estimating two versions of the earnings-and-book value
model.20 Consistent with Blacconiere et al. earnings-and-book value jointly influence utility
firm valuation in a deregulated environment.
The regression results which appear in Table 4 form the basis from which to test Hypotheses
1, 2 and 3. The overall model is significant (F = 115.981, p = 0.000) as are all of the parameter
estimates. The positive and significant (t = 3.545, p = 0.000) coefficient on the dummy
variable MULTI indicates that, relative to purely domestic utilities, nonaccounting variables,
i.e., factors other than book value and earnings, influence the share prices of multinational
utilities.
The coefficient on the interaction term between book value of equity and the multinational
dummy variable is negative, −0.395, and significant (t = −4.674, p = 0.000). It can be
inferred from this result that book value plays a less important role in the valuation of multina-
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Table 5
Estimation of interactive effects with foreign currency translation adjustments
Model: Pt +1 = β0 + β1 × MULTI + β2 × BVEt + β3 × MULTI × BVEt + β4
× EPSt + β5 × MULTI × EPSt + β6 × FCTA + ε
Variable
Coefficient
Standard error
t-statistic

Significance

Constant
MULTI
BVE
BVE × MULTI
EPS
EPS × MULTI
FCTA

0.000
0.001
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.044
0.020

10.365
4.779
0.966
−0.392
3.753
2.535
−7.004
Adjusted R2 = 0.336

1.031
1.426
0.064
0.085
0.790
1.257
3.017

10.057
3.353
15.132
−4.639
4.752
2.017
−2.321
F = 97.421

tional utilities. This may be due to the fact that foreign domiciled net assets may produce a less
certain earnings stream relative to domestically domiciled net assets. Furthermore, the valuation of the foreign domiciled net assets in dollar terms will likely exhibit greater variability as
exchange rates fluctuate.
The coefficient on the interaction term between earnings and the multinational dummy
variable is positive and significant (t = 2.007, p < 0.0445). This result suggests that earnings
play a greater role in valuation for multinational utilities relative to domestic ones. This result
is somewhat confounding given that multinational utilities have lower absolute and relative
levels of profitability compared to purely domestic concerns. The higher multiple on earnings,
which are at least partially foreign derived,21 may stem from the fact that investors expect
that future earnings will be higher given the high growth rates associated with many emerging
markets.
The results of an expanded version of the model, which incorporates the effects of foreign
currency translation adjustments, are presented in Table 5. The parameter estimate on the per
share amount of translation adjustments is significant (t = −2.321, p < 0.020); however,
the negative sign on the coefficient suggests that as translation losses increase in magnitude,
equity prices will increase. This result is counterintuitive and may be explained by two factors.
One possibility is that the model is misspecified; however, existing studies (e.g., Bartov, 1997),
have shown foreign currency translation adjustments to be a salient determinant of equity
valuation. The second, more plausible explanation is that investors have a misdirected notion
of the exchange rate risks of multinational utilities.
Utilities have engaged in foreign activities for less than a decade. Investors may be unfamiliar with or unaware of the relevance of foreign currency translation adjustments. All of
the multinational utilities in this study reported the foreign currency translation adjustments,
a component of comprehensive income, in the statement of changes in stockholders’ equity.
Hirst and Hopkins (1998) indicate that only when the components of comprehensive income
are reported in a statement of financial performance are analyst able to correctly utilize this
information in making judgments relative to valuation. To further complicate the matter, Standard and Poor’s COMPUSTAT database does not report translation adjustments for utility
firms.22
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Table 6
Estimation of interactive effects with foreign currency translation adjustments (annual observations)
Model: Pt +1 = β0 + β1 × MULTI + β2 × BVEt + β3 × MULTI × BVEt + β4
× EPSt + β5 × MULTI × EPSt + β6 × FCTA + ε
Variable
Coefficient
Standard error
t-statistic

Significance

Constant
MULTI
BVE
BVE × MULTI
EPS
EPS × MULTI
FCTA

0.000
0.066
0.000
0.023
0.000
0.680
0.000

10.201
5.343
0.848
−0.438
2.196
0.361
−13.867
Adjusted R2 = 0.390

2.166
2.893
0.148
0.192
0.598
0.874
2.455

4.709
1.847
5.716
−2.282
3.672
0.413
−5.648
F = 34.337

5.4. Model estimation with annual data
In order to test the robustness of the model presented in Table 5, the expanded version of
the earnings-and-book model was estimated with annual data from the years 1996 to 2000.23
These results appear in Table 6. The parameter estimates on all variables are all of the same
algebraic sign and most are close to the magnitude of the estimates obtained with quarterly data.
The parameter estimate on the dummy variable MULTI, strictly speaking, is not significant at
conventional levels (t = 1.847, p < 0.066). However, if one accepts the argument that it is
marginally significant, accounting information explains less of the variation in equity values
of multinational utilities relative to their domestic counterparts.
The only key difference that exists between the models estimated with quarterly and annual
data is the parameter estimate on the earnings per share interaction term. The lack of significance
(t = 0.413, p < 0.680) suggests investors do not assign a higher weight to the annual earnings
of multinational utilities. Similar to the quarterly data, the annual audited earnings per share
numbers between the two groups do differ: multinationals report an average EPS of $1.56
while domestic firms reported an average EPS of $1.70. Employing a t-test, this difference is
not statistically significant (t = 0.870, p < 0.385). However, nonparametric tests indicate that
a significant difference does exist (Z = −1.925, p < 0.054). Given the fact that the annual
regressions were run with only 314 observations as compared to 1147 for the quarterly dataset,
the smaller sample size may be driving this difference.
5.5. Accounting information over time
In order to examine the impact of the changing institutional environment over time, the
earnings-and-book value model was re-estimated with annual groupings of quarterly observations for each of the two sub-samples. The regression results are reported in Table 7.
Several observations can be made from the empirical evidence found in Table 7. Firstly, the
value relevance of accounting information for multinational utilities has declined over time.
In 1996, earnings-and-book values explained approximately 56% of the variation in equity
values for this group of firms; by 2000, the explanatory power had dropped to approximately
4%. Although a similar observation can be made regarding purely domestic firms, the reduction
is more pronounced for those firms with overseas exposures.
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Table 7
Comparative relevance of accounting information (model estimated with quarterly data grouped by year)
Model: Pt +1 = β0 + β1 × BVE + β2 × EPS + β3 × FCTA + ε
Year

Multinational utilities

1996
Intercept term
Coefficient on BVE
Coefficient on EPS
FCTA significant?
Adjusted R2

8.987
0.627
11.800
No
0.557

1997
Intercept term
Coefficient on BVE
Coefficient on EPS
FCTA significant?
Adjusted R2

12.463
0.704
5.707
Yes
0.359

1998
Intercept Term
Coefficient on BVE
Coefficient on EPS
FCTA significant?
Adjusted R2

12.674
0.828
6.678
Yes
0.507

1999
Intercept Term
Coefficient on BVE
Coefficient on EPS
FCTA significant?
Adjusted R2

18.683
0.411
6.066
No
0.197

12.838
0.842
4.408
n/a
0.391

2000 (Q1–Q3)
Intercept Term
Coefficient on BVE
Coefficient on EPS
FCTA significant?
Adjusted R2

29.556
−0.114∗
7.055
No
0.039

15.564
0.440
12.086
n/a
0.263

∗

Domestic utilities
9.136
0.909
1.910∗
n/a
0.509
8.865
1.061
−0.093∗
n/a
0.442
6.579
1.332
3.299
n/a
0.647

Coefficient is not significant at the 5% level.

Secondly, with the exception of 1996, the adjusted R2 s on the models estimated with domestic
firm data exceed those generated with the multinational firm data. From these results, an
inference can be made that accounting information is weakly correlated with equity prices
when the firms’ environment is relatively unstable.
For years 1996 and 1997, earnings are not significant in the domestic firm valuation model.
Moreover, the coefficient on book value in both years is not significantly different from one.
Consistent with Nwaeze (1998), book values and market values are aligned for this subset
of firms. However, as the impact of deregulation unfolds, even for domestic firms, earnings
become more important determinants of market values. Finally, by 2000, the double effect of
international expansion coupled with domestic deregulation has eliminated the relevance of
book values for multinational utilities.
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6. Discussion
This paper has documented that both earnings-and-book values play a role in the valuation
of multinational utilities. Relative to purely domestic utilities, book value exerts less of an
influence on valuation; moreover, earnings play a more fundamental role in valuation. Hence,
there exists a trade-off between the value relevance of book value and earnings in a multinational
setting. This finding is somewhat puzzling given the fact that multinational utilities report lower
levels and rates of profitability compared to purely domestic concerns. Evidence presented here
also indicates that a greater degree of nonaccounting information appears to be priced into the
equities of multinational utilities relative to domestic ones.
The lower earnings does not appear to be impounded into the market values of multinational
utilities. In fact, multinational utilities trade at higher market-to-book multiples relative to their
domestic counterparts. The empirical evidence presented in this study alludes to the fact that
multinational utilities may be systematically overpriced.
The financial press as well as the utilities themselves have presented a rosy, if confusing,
picture of the perceived benefits of global diversification. For example, firms such as AES
and Enron have taken up the practice of reporting “pro-forma” earnings which paper over
significant weak spots on the company’s quarterly profit and loss statements.
It is plausible that investors’ expectations were not grounded in a solid economic analysis
of the underlying events but by a sense of euphoria created by both the academic and financial
press. The case of multinational utilities may be a case of analysts, investors and capital
markets “believing what they want to believe.” Deregulation, privatization and globalization,
the cornerstones of neoliberal economic policies, are supposed to produce benefits to those
parties willing to undertake the risk.
Concurrent with the conclusion of this paper, events are rapidly unfolding which challenge
the efficacy of the neoliberal economic model. In the final days of 2001, Enron, the global
power giant, has filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. On January 11, 2002, its common
stock traded at $0.67 per share.24 Argentina, a pioneer in utility deregulation and the host
to over one billion dollars of U.S. utility FDI, is weathering a brutal political and economic
crisis.
The Argentine crisis has henceforth been dubbed the “tango effect.” Seven years earlier the
world witnessed a similar debacle in Mexico known as the “tequila surprise.” The following
comment was made by Krugman (1995, p. 28) in the aftermath of the Mexican peso collapse:
Governments that had spent half a century pursuing statist, protectionist policies suddenly got
free market religion. It was, it seemed to many observers, the dawn of a new age for global
capitalism.

In a turning point in the political-economic cycle, brought about by popular unrest, the
government of Argentina during January 2002 publicly expressed its intent to revisit the terms
of the contractual agreements signed with foreign utilities. It remains to be seen whether other
Latin countries follow suit.
In conclusions, two general observations can be made regarding equity valuation in a changing institutional context. Firstly, markets appear to be myopic. While the massive wave of privatizations carried out during the 1990’s has no historical equivalent, emerging market economies
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are still plagued by the same maladies that have plagued them for years: political instability,
unsustainable budget deficits, currency collapses, and a legal system built upon shifting sands.
The market appears to have forgotten that many of the underlying economic conditions that
caused Mexico to devalue its peso in 1994 were also responsible for prompting Argentina to
abandon its peso-dollar peg in 2002.
Ironically, multinationals utilities have, on average, 13.5 analysts following their activities.
This compares to 8 for purely domestic firms.25
However, manpower alone may not eliminate mispricing if financial markets cannot accurately assimilate value relevant information.
A final point is that accounting information, if it is performing its function as a referee in
capital markets, should alleviate information asymmetries, not increase them. The proliferation of dubious accounting methods, such as allowing companies to “bury” foreign currency
translation adjustments in stockholders’ equity, reduces the value relevance of accounting information. The advent of pro forma earnings announcements further muddies the waters and
renders financial reporting a less-than-transparent process.

Notes
1. Chile is a notable exception. The Chilean government began privatizing its energy
sector in 1985.
2. Sader (1995, p. v) explains, “Privatizations in developing countries were an important
element underlying the rapid increase in foreign direct investment to these countries
in recent years. Especially Latin America, East Asia and countries in Eastern Europe managed to attract substantial amounts of foreign investment through the sale
of state-owned enterprises to foreign buyers.” Many countries formally announced
the creation of privatization programs; for example, during 1991, the National Privatization Program (PND—Programa Nacional de Desestatizacao) was established in
Brazil.
3. Comment made during a May 1997 presentation at Rutgers University.
4. Interestingly, in the past utility stocks had represented the quintessential “low risk”
equity investment. During the time period of this study, the mean beta, or measure of
systematic risk, for multinational utilities more than doubled, from 0.28 to 0.57.
5. One of the maintained assumptions of this research is that accounting earnings, which
typically capture the effects of past events, are significantly different from the economic
earnings of multinational utility firms. Additionally, accounting earnings may also omit
certain value-relevant pieces of information.
6. Economic reforms in Latin America were profound and deep, so much so that many
Latin countries had to amend or change their constitutions to allow for the denationalization of the public sector. For more detail on this subject, the interested reader is
referred to Pinto (2001) “The Denationalization and Privatization of Public Utilities
in Latin America.”
7. Interestingly, this restriction does not appear to be ironclad. Cinergy discloses in its
1998 annual report, “During 1998, Cinergy received approval from the Securities
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9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

14.
15.
16.
17.

18.
19.
20.

21.

22.
23.
24.
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and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) to invest up to 100% of its retained earnings in
foreign utility companies (“FUCOs”) and “exempt wholesale generators” (“EWGs”).
In December 31, 1998, Cinergy’s consolidated retained earnings equaled $945 million
and its aggregate investment in EWGs and FUCOs totaled $619 million, of which
approximately $108 million was invested during 1998.” (Cinergy, 1998, Form 10-K)
This claim is not pure conjecture on the part of the author. A perusal of the 1998 and
1999 corporate annual reports of the multinational utilities reveals the ubiquitous quest
for profits derived from foreign sources.
It should be noted that the theories discussed are not intended to represent an exhaustive
list of the many theories of foreign direct investment.
AES has adopted this practice in Brazil while the rate structure of Teco’s Guatemala
subsidiary fluctuates with the U.S. dollar.
The time period of their investigation runs from 1992 to 1996.
For more on this matter, see “Indian Paradox: States Starved for Electricity Spook the
Big Producers,” in The Wall Street Journal, Wednesday, March 14, 2001, A-16.
Outlying observations were deleted from the sample. Outlying observations included
those firms that had reported quarterly net earnings per share in excess of an absolute
value of $1.80 per share. Firms that reported negative book values were also deleted
from the sample.
It will be recalled that the legal framework which paved the way for utilities’ FDI was
enacted in 1992.
The Mann–Whitney U and Wilcoxon W, nonparametric test statistics, calculated for
the above pairings of variables yield identical inferences.
This test was replicated using fully diluted earnings per share; the end results were
identical.
These crisis include the Asian Crisis of 1997, the Russian Ruble Crisis of 1998, the
devaluation of the Brazilian Real in 1999, and a prolonged economic contraction in
Argentina.
Two examples are AES in Brazil and Enron in India.
Haugen (1995) indicates that most firm’s betas fall between 0.40 and 1.60.
Specification checks were run to detect the presence of multicollinearity and heteroskedasticity in the model. The results reported are not tainted by collinear predictor
variables or heteroskedatistic disturbances.
During the time period of this study, the percentage of earnings that came from foreign sources as a percentage of total earnings was as follows: 1996, 11.5%; 1997,
15.7%; 1998, 25.4%; 1999, 22.3%; 2000, 15.3%. These numbers were obtained from
Standard and Poor’s COMPUSTAT database and represent the averages for the multinational subsample. The decrease in 2000 is likely caused by unfavorable exchange
rate movements.
A representative of Standard and Poor’s told the author that “utilities are purely domestic enterprises, therefore they do not have foreign currency translation adjustments.”
Univariate tests were also conducted with the annual dataset on the variables reported
in Table 3. Similar inferences can be drawn from the results.
In contrast, Enron closed at $89.25 on the final day of the third quarter of 2000.
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25. The average number of sell-side analysts as reported by Standard and Poor’s COMPUSTAT.
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